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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4510  
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5268  
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5534  
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0711  
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3541  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4894  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0827  
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY 3017  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1464  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000104

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DEPT FOR SCA/INS, IO

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [NP](#) [UN](#)

SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIANS WANT POLICE ADVISORS, EXPLOSIVES  
OUT OF DRAFT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

1. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee requested a meeting with the Ambassador January 18 to relay New Delhi's concern with references in the draft UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) on Nepal to police advisors as well as the U.S.-proposed clause on explosive devices. Ambassador Mukherjee said that, while India would not block the presence of UN police advisors, it did not want the advisors explicitly mentioned in the resolution, citing the potential for mission creep and UN "intrusiveness" in a Nepal-led election process. Mukherjee also said India preferred that language on mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordinance be omitted. These arms management details were already included in the prior November 28 Agreement on the Management of Arms and Armies, he said. Ambassador Mukherjee reiterated India's goal of a focused and limited UN Mission in Nepal with ownership of the peace process firmly in the hands of the Nepali Government. Both Ambassadors agreed that speedy finalization of a resolution was critical for success of arms management, and that small details in the draft UNSCR's language should not get in the way of its rapid adoption.

Indians Allergic to Police Advisor References

2. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee requested a meeting with the Ambassador January 18 to express New Delhi's concerns about the draft UNSCR on Nepal pending in New York. Specifically, he raised Indian concerns with the U.S. request to add a subparagraph in Para 1(d) on a police advisory component to the election aspect of the UN mission. He also was uncomfortable with the proposed UK "compromise" language: "To provide technical support to the national electoral authorities for the planning, preparation, and conduct (of elections), including with regard to security issues." Citing the potential for mission creep and UN "intrusiveness" implicit in this language, Ambassador Mukherjee said Delhi preferred to retain the original language, "To provide technical support to the national electoral authorities for

the conduct of elections in a free and fair atmosphere, in consultation with the parties." Ambassador Moriarty reminded Ambassador Mukherjee that in previous meetings Mukherjee had said that India would not block a small UN police advisory presence. Ambassador Mukherjee responded that the Indians still assumed they would be "living with" UN police advisors in reality, but did not want this component to be a part of the resolution's language.

#### Indians Don't Want Explosives Mentioned

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¶3. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee said that New Delhi believed it was not necessary for the UNSCR to refer to the management of mines, IEDs, and explosives in the agreement text, referencing the U.S. proposed language in para 1(a), "To monitor the management of arms and armed personnel.. including technical assistance with respect to mines, improvised explosive devices, and unexploded ordinance (Draft SCR rev 1 - 16 January 2007)." Ambassador Mukherjee and Ambassador Moriarty agreed that the November 28 Tripartite Agreement among the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), Maoists, and UN on the Management of Arms and Armies made extensive and explicit reference to the management of explosive devices. Ambassador Moriarty said that if prior agreements were referenced in the Resolution's preamble, language on explosives might not be necessary in the resolution itself, particularly if this might hold up the resolution's passage.

#### Status of Mission Agreement in Thirty days - Really Necessary?

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¶4. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee asked as well whether it was necessary to include U.S.-proposed language in para 6 of the draft SCR, "Further requests the Secretary-General and the Government of Nepal to conclude a status of mission agreement within 30 days of adoption of this resolution." Ambassador Mukherjee said that he had been told that a status of mission agreement (SOMA) was a standard operating procedure for the UN and did not need to be explicitly mentioned in the resolution, adding another timeline to the process. Both Ambassadors agreed that whether the SOMA language was included in the resolution should be based on precedent set in previous and similar SCRs.

#### Comment

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¶5. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee's requests are not dramatically at odds with U.S. views on the scope of a UN mission and we urge SCA, IO, and USUN to consider India's concerns to ensure the resolution's rapid adoption. If a limited number of police advisors in practice will be accepted by the Indians, and if the UNSCR recognizes the November 28 Agreement on the Management of Arms and Armies (which included detailed provisions related to explosive devices), these vital issues could still be addressed by the UN Mission. From our perspective, the need of the hour is for the speedy adoption of a UNSCR that is robust enough to ensure effective arms management in the near-term and an environment conducive for free and fair elections.

MORIARTY